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Ontology is often described as the inquiry into what exists, but there is some
disagreement  among (meta-)  ontologists  about  what  “existence” means  and
whether there are different kinds or senses of “existence” or just one; that is,
whether “existence” is equivocal or univocal. Furthermore, there is a growing
number  of  philosophers  (many  of  whom  take  inspiration  from  Aristotle’s
metaphysical writings) who argue that ontology should not be concerned so
much with what exists, but with what is fundamental or real (or something
similar). Each of the positions in this debate is centered on a concept or small
class of concepts that is intended to capture what ontology is about. Examples
of such  ontological core concepts are:  existence, subsistence, Dasein, being,
independent  being,  being  real,  being  fundamental,  being  a  fundamental
constituent  of  reality,  being  irreducible.  This  paper  intends  to  answer  the
twofold question of what (kind of notions) these ontological core concepts are,
and how (and how much) they (can) differ. I will argue that there can be no
difference between such concepts other than differing domains, and that any
domain  is  a  restriction  in  a  maximally  expanded  universe,  and  therefore,
equivalent to a (restricting) property.  Furthermore, such differences between
domains  (or  restricting  properties)  are  intertranslatable,  and  consequently,
there is not much room for substantial difference. Whatever difference remains
is  largely  due  to  differences  in  focus  or  differences  in  the  (phrasing  of)
questions ontologists try to answer.
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An  ‘ontological  core  concept’ –  hereafter  abbreviated  as  OCC –  can  be
roughly  defined  as  an  existence-like  notion  or  fundamental  property  that
captures, according to the meta-ontological theory it is the centerpiece of, what
ontology is (or should be) about. An OCC can be formally represented as the
function  ε  in ε (⌜ x) ,  where  ⌝ x is  either  a  constant  (e.g. Sherlock Holmes,  or
Mount  Fuji)  or  a  class  or  kind of  objects  or  events  (e.g. atoms,  chairs,  or
apceans).  In the former case, it  may be more appropriate to write ε (⌜ c) , in⌝
which  c stands  for  a  constant;  while  in  the  latter  case,  ε (⌜ x)  abbreviates⌝
 ⌜∃x[F(x) ε(∧ x)]  or some similar formula (see below), where F represents the⌝
class  of  objects  or  events.  (Of  course,  strictly  speaking,  F  in  F(⌜ x)  is  a⌝
predicate, and the corresponding class F is defined as F=df{x|F(x)}.)
The examples of OCCs listed above can be grouped into two kinds:  being in
some  way and  being  something;  or  in  terms  used  in  the  rough  definition:
existence-like notions and fundamental properties. OCCs of the first kind are
expressed  in  a  variety  of  ways  including  adverbial  constructions  and
“existence as ...”,1 while those of the latter kind usually expressed by means of
an adjective (or sometimes a noun phrase). Of the nine examples above, the
first four belong to the first kind, the last four to the second, and the fifth could
be understood as an example of either (if “being independent” is considered
synonymous with “independent being”). It seems natural to formally represent
the OCCs of  the first  kind (being in  some way;  existence-like notions)  by
means  of  an  existential  quantifier,  and  those  of  the  latter  kind  (being
something;  fundamental  properties)  by means of  a one-place predicate,  and
those indeed are the most common interpretations of the function ε (although
this is more often expressed informally than in such formal terms).
If Bε stands for an appropriate one-place predicate and   ∃ε for an appropriate
kind of existential quantifier, then ε (⌜ x)  would be B⌝ ε(c) or  ∃εx[c=x] in case of a
1 It should be noted that not every notion of “existence as ...” is an OCC. OCCs capture what
ontology should be about (according to some theory), and it is difficult to imagine a meta-
ontological theory with “existence as monotreme” as its core concept, for example.
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constant  c, and  ∃x[F(x) B∧ ε(x)] or  ∃εx[F(x)] in case of a class F of objects or
events.2 Although quantifiers and one-place predicates are the most common
forms of OCCs (or most obvious interpretations if form is unspecified), this
does not exhaust the theoretical possibilities. In principle, an OCC can also
take  the  form  of  a  more  complex  (n-place)  predicate  or  a  sentence-level
operator (other than quantification), but such notions are very uncommon. 
OCCs can differ  between and within languages,  frameworks,  or conceptual
schemes. The notion of a language or scheme in this context is a ‘thin’ notion:
it is not a requirement that these are non-intertranslatable and neither do they
(necessarily)  presuppose  sense  data  or  the  ‘third  dogma  of  empiricism’
(Davidson 1974);  languages or  schemes in this sense merely differ in their
OCCs. Mainstream analytical metaphysics rejects both difference between and
within schemes. Hence, in such theories there is one and only one OCC, and
according  to  ‘neo-Quineans’ such  as  Peter  van  Inwagen  (1998;  2009)  and
Theodore  Sider  (2003;  2009)  this  is  unrestricted  existential  quantification.
‘Neo-Aristotelians’ such  as  Jonathan  Schaffer  (2009)  and  Kit  Fine  (2009)
argue  for  a  property like  being  fundamental,  being  real,  or  being  a
fundamental constituent of reality as the one and only OCC.
Meta-ontological  theories  arguing for  different  OCCs  between languages or
schemes are generally based on Carnap  (1950).  Well  known proponents  of
such a theory include  Goodman and Putnam, and more recently,  Eli Hirsch
(2002),  who  claims  that  different  conceptual  schemes  have  different
unrestricted existential quantifiers.  Theories of difference  within schemes are
more  common in  Continental  than  in  analytic  philosophy.  The best  known
2 There are some further options such as  ∀x[(F(x) B∧ ε(x))→  ∃εy[y=x]], combining Bε and  ∃ε; and
 ∀x[(F(x)→  ∃εy[y=x]], which would have the (seemingly, at least) paradoxical implication that
– if,  for  example, “horse(s)” is  substituted for F – either  fictional  (or  otherwise ‘unreal’)
horses exist, or that a fictional horse is not a horse, somewhat like Gongsun Long’s famous
argument that a white horse is not a horse. With regards to the analysis of the OCCs B ε and  ∃ε
these  ‘further  options’ do not  differ  significantly from the  more  basic  options  mentioned
above, however, and for that reason, they will be further ignored here.
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proponent of such a theory in analytic philosophy is Gilbert Ryle (1949). This
kind of theories often employ multiple existence-like notions such as  being,
subsistence,  existence, and Dasein, or distinguish different kinds or senses of
existence  by  adding  the  preposition  “as”  followed  by  a  descriptive  noun
phrase,  or  through adverbial  modification.  For  example,  “Sherlock  Holmes
exists as fictional object, but does not really exist.” 3
An ontological claim ε (⌜ x)⌝ in a (ordinary, non-formal) language or scheme L
can  be  represented  in  a  formal language     that  consists  of  a  ℒ syntax,  a
vocabulary V, and a model . The syntax is the set of logical symbols (andℳ
their associated rules for correct use) needed in formalization. Because we do
not need to formalize whole languages but just existential claims, the standard
logical symbols  ,∀   , , , →, ↔, ¬, with the addition of the identity sign =,∃ ∧ ∨
should  be  sufficient. The  vocabulary  V is  the  set  of  non-logical  symbols:
constants,  predicate symbols,  function symbols,  and so forth.  The model ℳ
consists of the universe (of the model) M and the interpretation function  I,
which assigns interpretations to the elements of V, such that for a constant  c:
I(c) M, for a one-place predicate F: ∈ I(F) M, and so forth.⊆
Syntax, universe M, vocabulary V, and interpretation function I can all differ
between  (formal)  languages.  If  “atom”  in  the  sentence  “atoms  exist”  is
interpreted differently in L1 than in L2 – either because of a difference in
interpretation  function  I or  in  universe  M  –  then  “atoms  exist”  (or
 ⌜∃x[atom(x) ε(∧ x)]⌝)  has  a  different  meaning,  and  therefore  possibly  also  a
different truth value,  in these two languages.  The focus of this paper is  on
OCCs ε, however, and not on the things x that are said to exist or be real (and
so forth) and for that reason I will assume agreement between languages with
regards  to  the  latter.  (Nevertheless,  much  of  the  actual  ontological
3 Sider and van Inwagen, the two main proponents of mainstream ‘univocalism’,  defend their
views against different opponents: the Sider - Hirsch/Eklund debate concerns the possibility of
difference between schemes, while van Inwagen argues against theories that propose different
OCCs within schemes. (e.g. Sider 2007; van Inwagen 2009.)
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disagreement  between  schemes/languages  may  be  caused  by  this  kind  of
differences.) In terms of the four variants of ε (⌜ x)  distinguished above, B⌝ ε(c),  ∃
εx[c=x],  ∃x[F(x) B∧ ε(x)], and  ∃εx[F(x)], this means that  c and F are considered
to be invariant between languages.
Of  the  two common interpretations of  the function ε  in  ε (⌜ x) ,   ⌝ ∃ε seems to
belong  to  the  syntax  of  the  (formal  equivalent  of  the)  language  that  the
existential sentence appears in, while Bε (like c and F) is an element of V, and
is  mapped  to  universe  M  by  interpretation  I(Bε).  Bε can  differ  between
languages  in  the  same  way  as  c and  F  (or  “atom”).  For  example,  if  the
predicate Bε implies being tangible in L1 and being visible in L2, then there
probably are many cases of differing truth values between L1 and L2 for the
claim  “x exists”.  Assuming  that  Davidson’s  (1974;  1988)  (and  others’)
arguments against  non-intertranslatable schemes or languages are valid (see
also Brons 2011; 2012),  such differences do not preclude the translation of
existential statements from L1 to L2 and  vice versa, and consequently, such
variants of Bε differ about as much  as temperature measurements in degrees
Fahrenheit and Celsius (Davidson 1977, 224-5; 1989, 65).
The main alternative for interpretation of the function ε as a predicate B ε is
interpretation  as  an  existential  quantifier   ∃ε.  In  mainstream  analytical
metaphysics,  for  example,  ε  is  claimed  to  be  unrestricted  existential
quantification  . ∃ This raises the question what exactly existential quantification
is (or  does).  Since  Frege’s  (1893,  §§22-3)  argument  that  “existence”  is  a
‘second-level  concept’ it  has become common in model theory4 to think of
quantifiers as second-order relations: a quantifier is an operator that maps sets
of individuals to sets of sets of individuals. The specific quantifier   means∃
that that mapping is non-empty:   in  is {A M|∃ ℳ ⊆ A≠ } ∅ (Peters & Westerståhl
2006, 60). This implies, that  ∃1 and  ∃2 in formal languages  1 and  2 can onlyℒ ℒ
4 Although  other  interpretations  of  quantification  are  possible,  ‘the  general  notion  of  a
quantifier is model-theoretic in nature’ (Peters & Westerståhl 2006, 74), and considering that
(the semantics of) any (natural) language or scheme necessarily involves a model, the model-
theoretic approach is especially appropriate in the present context.
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differ if the two models have different universes: M1≠M2 (as there is, besides
M, nothing that can differ in {A M|A≠ }).⊆ ∅
Universes – and domains of quantifiers in general – are generally considered to
be sets in model theory (id., 48), but they can also be proper classes. In case of
unrestricted quantification, the domain of the quantifier is the universe of the
model.  Restriction  adds  a  limitation,  a  restricting  property  R  such  that
 ∃Rx[φ(x)] is equivalent to  ∃x[R(x) φ(∧ x)]. Thus, anything quantified over by an
unrestricted quantifier at least has the property of being a member of M, and
anything quantified over by an R-restricted quantifier   ∃R has the additional
property R (and is a  member of  the associated class  R={x|R(x)},  such that
R M). Consequently, if ε is  ⊆ ∃R1 in  1 and  ℒ ∃R2 in  2 and R1 is not the sameℒ
property as R2, then ε (x)  has different meanings in  ⌜ ⌝  ℒ1 and  2. Hoℒ wever,
given  the  equivalence  of   ∃Rx[φ(x)]  with   ∃x[R(x) φ(∧ x)],  this  difference  is
nothing but a difference of properties  R1 and R2 (and these properties  are
additional requirements in the definition of existence, such as being tangible in
L1 and being visible in L2, as in the example mentioned above).
If R is a restriction of M, then conversely, M is an expansion of R (Fine 2006).
If  domains are understood to be sets,  then R is a subset  of  M and M is a
superset of R. If ε is  unrestricted quantification in both L1 and L2 and their
formal equivalents   1 and  2, then,  ℒ ℒ as mentioned above,   ∃1 and  ∃2 can only
differ if the two languages have different universes: M1≠M2. However, for any
two languages  1 and  2 that have the same syntax but different universes Mℒ ℒ 1
and  M2,  a  combination can  be  constructed  that  is  the  smallest  possible
expansion of both M1 and M2 (in set-theoretical terms, this would be the union
of M1 and M2). In the combined language  ℒC that shares the same syntax, but
that  has  universe  MC=M1 M∪ 2,  the  translations  of   ∃1 and   ∃2 are  restricted
existential quantifiers, restricted by the properties of being an element of (the
translation of) M1 and being an element of (the translation of) M2, respectively.
While a combined language  ℒC is an  ad hoc solution to translate  1 and  2ℒ ℒ
into a common framework, it  is also possible to conceive of a language  ℒU
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with  universe  MU,  such  that  any existential  quantifier  either  has  the  same
domain  MU or  a  subset  thereof,  and  therefore,  would  be  equivalent  to  a
restricted quantifier in  ℒU. If MU is a set, then because of Russel’s Paradox, it
cannot include absolutely everything. One possible solution for this problem is
conceiving of universes or domains as classes rather than sets.  However,  it
should be noted that MU does not need to include absolutely everything for  ℒU
to do the work it is supposed to do: it ‘merely’ needs to include all domains of
all existential quantifiers. This may not seem particularly helpful, as we do not
know what future generations may want to quantify over (while that needs to
be in MU),5 but that does not matter for two reasons. Firstly, we do not need to
be able to list what exactly is in MU; we only need to know that if something is
(or  even can be)  quantified over,  it  is  in  MU.  Secondly,  the superset  of  all
domains  of  all  existential  quantifiers  is  a  subset  of  everything  that  can be
existentially quantified over, and that is  nearly absolutely everything: it only
excludes that what cannot possibly be coherently said to exist (such as the set
of  all  sets  that  are  not  members  of  themselves,  thus  avoiding  Russel’s
Paradox); and for all purposes, MU can be assumed to coincide with this set of
everything that can be existentially quantified over.6
If any existential quantifier either is identical with  ∃U (the existential quantifier
of  ℒU) or is a restriction thereof, and any restriction R in  ⌜∃Rx[φ(x)]  can be⌝
reduced to (i.e. is equivalent to) a property R in  ⌜∃x[R(x) φ(∧ x)]  (see above),⌝
then any OCC that takes the form of a quantifier is either a maximally general
notion of existence (see below for interpretation of  ∃U),  or (reducible to) a
5 Speakers of languages with obligatory tense marking such as English may feel an intuitive
need to restrict MU to what exists  now (or at some other point in time), but this would be a
more restricted notion than the one I am suggesting here. Nevertheless, from a metaphysical
point of view, such temporal restrictions may be very useful; and to formalize “existence” in
such a language it would even be necessary.
6 Rayo & Uzquiano (eds.) (2006) is a collection of recent papers on the problem of quantifying
over absolutely everything.  The suggestion offered in  this  and the preceding paragraph is
loosely based on Kit Fine’s notion of expansion (as the opposite of restriction) presented in his
paper in that collection.
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property. In other words, any difference between quantifiers is a difference of
domains  that  can  be  reduced  to  a  difference  between  restricting properties
which are one-place predicates  functioning exactly like,  and with the exact
seem  purpose  as  Bε in   ⌜∃x[F(x) B∧ ε(x)] .  According  to  Eli  Hirsch  (2002),⌝
different  notions  of  existence  in  different  schemes  or  languages  are  not
differently  restricted  existential  quantifiers,  but  different  variants  of  the
unrestricted existential quantifier. This, however, is impossible (but see below).
Given  the  definition  of  existential  quantification  as  {A M|A≠ }, the  only⊆ ∅
possible  difference  is  a  difference  in  domains  M,  and  any  difference  in
domains is effectively (after translation in  ℒC or  ℒU, if necessary) a restriction.
Moreover, because any property can serve as a restriction, and conversely, any
restriction  can  be  interpreted  as  (or  reduced  to)  a  property,  there  is  no
fundamental  difference  between  a  property  like  ‘being  a  fundamental
constituent of reality’, a common neo-Aristotelian OCC, and the existence-like
notion  ‘existence  as a  fundamental  constituent  of  reality’,  or  between
 ∃x[F(x) B∧ ε(x)] and  ∃εx[F(x)].
Although by far the most common, quantification and predication are not the
only possible interpretations of ε in ε (⌜ x) . As mentioned above, ε could also be⌝
a sentence level operator other than existential quantification, but suggestions
of  this  kind  are  rare.  Kit  Fine  (2009)  argues  that  it  is  not  existential
quantification that matters in ontology, but “a certain concept of what is real”
(p. 171), and defines the predicate R, ‘being real’, in terms of an operator on
sentences  R that  means  something  like  ‘it  is  constitutive  of  reality  that’:
Rx =df  φ∃  R[φx]  (pp.  171-2).  If  ε (⌜ x)  is   φ⌝ ∃  R[φx]  in   1 (and we ignore theℒ
definitional equivalence to Rx) then it may be the case that ε represents another
function in  2, or that  1 and  2 differ with regards to their interpretations ofℒ ℒ ℒ
what it means to be ‘constitutive of reality’, and this latter possibility points at
a  problem.  In  “Ontological  relativity”  (1968),  Quine  pointed  out  that  “a
question of the form ‘What is an F?’ can be answered only by recourse to a
further  term:  ‘An F is  a  G’.  The answer  makes  only relative  sense:  sense
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relative to an uncritical acceptance of ‘G’” (p. 204). Fine’s proposal to define
‘being real’ in terms of a sentence-level operator ‘being constitutive of reality
that’ seems to get things the wrong way around. Of course, he is well aware of
the  problem  that  his  account  depends  on  a  previous  understanding  of  the
notion of reality, but he does “not see any way to define the concept of reality
in  essentially  different  terms;  the  metaphysical  circle  of  ideas  to  which  it
belongs is one from which there appears to be no escape” (p. 175). We do,
however, seem “to have a good intuitive grasp of the concept” (id.; italics in
original). But even if we do have such an intuitive grasp, it is not necessarily
the case that  intuitions converge.  Moreover,  Fine’s  proposal  gets things the
wrong way around in another, more problematic sense: his definition does not
just rest  upon the concept of reality,  but on being  constitutive of reality.  In
other words, the definition presumes a theory of what is constitutive of reality,
i.e. a metaphysical theory, and consequently, Fine’s definition turns out to be
that ‘being real’ is being real or fundamental or something similar according to
some previously accepted metaphysical theory. The complications result from
an attempt to define the predicate ‘being real’, specifically to define it in such a
way that it corresponds with the neo-Aristotelian OCC of ‘being a fundamental
constituent  of  reality’,  but  perhaps  ‘being  real’ should  be  taken  to  be  the
primitive notion. At least is seems much more intuitive than ‘being constitutive
of reality’. (And it seems considerably simpler and more intuitive to define
reality as the sum total of everything real than the other way around.) And if
we ignore its problematic definition, then all we are left with is the simple and
unproblematic one-place predicate ‘being real’ as OCC.
Although there is no obvious candidate, it is in principle possible that other
sentence  level  operators  are  more  successful  in  capturing  an  alternative
(formal) notion of existence (i.e. another OCC). Nevertheless, this particular
case arouses the suspicion that  such an approach would be overly complex
and/or stray too far from common conceptions of existence and what it means
to exist.
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Considering that a difference between quantifiers turned out to be a difference
between restricting properties, all differences between languages or schemes
considered thus far are semantic in nature (they are differences in vocabulary
and/or  differences  in  the  meaning/interpretation  of  symbols  in  those
vocabularies). However, it is also possible that languages differ in their syntax.
An  example  of  a  minor difference  in  syntax  could  be  the  rejection  of
existential import for the universal quantifier   in  ∀ one language involved. In
that language,  1,  ℒ ∀1 and  ∃1 would then effectively have different domains: the
domain of  ∀1 would be M1, but the domain of  ∃1 would be those things in M1
that  can  be  said  to  exist  in  that  language  (or  something  similar):  E1  M⊆ 1.
However, if such a language would be translated into another language  ℒT in
which both  ∀T and  ∃T have domain MT=M1, then  ∃1 would be translated as a
restricted  existential  quantifier   ∃TR,  where  the  restriction  domain  R=E1.7
(Which suggests that rejection of existential import is a variety of restriction,
and thus semantic rather than syntactic.)
Examples  of  more significant  differences in  syntax  are higher-order  logics,
plural logic, combinatory logic, the λ-calculus, and so forth, but it is difficult to
see  how such  syntactic  differences  could  lead  to  different  truth  values  of
simple existential statements that are more or less equivalent to  ∃x[F(x) B∧ ε(x)]
(to  which  the  other  options  where  shown  to  be  reducible  above).  If  we
substitute  “atoms”  for  F  and  “real”  for  Bε,  then  “atoms  exist”  could  be
formalized  as   ∃x[atom(x) real(∧ x)]  in  FOL.  In  plural  logic,  marking  plural
quantifiers and predicates with superscript P and representing plural variables
with italicized capitals, this would be  ∃PX[atomP(X) real∧ P(X)], and with some
effort  ∃x[atom(x) real(∧ x)] could also be translated into combinatory logic, for
example. None of these different formal representations has a different truth
value,  however,  and  neither  is  there  another  (metaphysically  relevant)
7 The language of the translation,   ℒT,  would be a richer language than   1ℒ  as it would enable
existential  quantification  over  everything in  MT=M1,  hence  unrestricted existential
quantification, which is impossible in  1, which raises the question whether  1 is a suitableℒ ℒ
language for formalizing existential statements (especially if  ℒT is also available).
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substitution for F that would result in differing truth values between different
syntaxes.  Perhaps  this  should not  come as  a  surprise:  the  question what  it
means to exist is a semantic question, not a syntactic one, and a difference with
regards to what it means to exist between languages is a semantic difference,
not a syntactic difference.
It was shown above that a difference between quantifiers in formal languages
can only be a difference between domains, and can therefore be reduced to a
difference between interpretations of the predicate Bε in sentences like B⌜ ε(c)⌝
and   ⌜∃x[F(x) B∧ ε(x)]  (for  constants  ⌝ c and  kinds  of  objects  or  events  F
respectively). However, as mentioned, Hirsch (2002) insists that the difference
between L1 and L2 is a difference of quantifiers, but not a difference of their
domains. It  was claimed above that  such a difference between languages is
impossible,  but  this claim needs some qualification. From the definition of
qualifiers in formal languages it follows that such a difference between  1 andℒ
 2 is impossible, but that does not necessarily mean that it is impossible forℒ
informal  languages L1 and L2 as well, provided that there are some kind of
Kripkensteinian complexities in at least one of those languages.
Consider, for example, the sentence
(s1) “a and b exist.”
which  is  uttered  in  three  different  languages  L1,  L2,  and  L3  that  are  all
deceptively similar to ordinary English in grammar and vocabulary,  but not
completely identical. If  a and b are simples, and ab is a composite consisting
of a and b, then correct (and complete) translations of (s1) uttered in the three
languages into ordinary English would be:
(t1) “a and b exist (but not ab).”
(t2) “a, b, and ab exist.”
(t3) “ab exists (but not a and b).”
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for L1,  L2, and L3 respectively.  If  it  is  subsequently attempted to translate
these three translations (t1) to (t3) into the three languages L1 to L3, then there
are three options.
[1] Some of the three sentences (t1) to (t3) cannot be translated into some of
the other languages. For example, in L1 it is impossible to say that ab (or any
composite,  for  that  matter)  exists,  and  therefore,  (t2)  and  (t3)  cannot  be
translated into L1. This option, however, needs to be discarded immediately
for two reasons. Firstly,  this would mean that the domain of “existence” is
restricted  to  simples  in  L1  while  we  are  looking  for  (the  possibility  of)
differences  other than different domains. Secondly, it seems implausible that
there are natural languages in which it is impossible to say something that can
be said in another language. The extensive literature in the field of linguistic
anthropology  shows  that  it  can  be  extremely  difficult in  some  cases,  but
extreme difficulty is  not  impossibility.  Furthermore,  if  language is  causally
related to external reality, as (among others) Davidson argues in his theory of
triangulation, then it is always possible to find or construct a translation (see
Brons (2012) for discussion of this argument).
[2] Translation  is  possible  but  complex,  but  does  not  require  additional
predicates. For example, the L1 translation of (t2) could be something like: “a
and b exist, and ab as a composite also exists, in addition to a and b.” In this
case,  the  difference  between  the  three  languages  is  a  difference  between
defaults: lacking contrary indication, the domain of “existence” is assumed to
consist  of  simples  only  in  L1,  of  simples  and  composites  in  L2,  and  of
composites  only in L3,  but the default  restrictions in  L1 and/or  L3 can be
overruled  by specification (or  context,  perhaps).  Hence,  the difference is  a
difference of domains, albeit only of default domains.
[3] Translation is possible but complex, and requires additional predicates. For
example, in L1 composites cannot be said to “exist”, but can be said to “axist”,
which is correctly translated into ordinary English as “exist”. Then (t2) can be
translated into L1 as “a and b exist, and ab axists.” L1 then, uses two different
64
What Does it Mean for Something to Exist?
existential verbs for simples and composites, in the same way that Japanese
uses two verbs ‘to be’ for animates (iru) and inanimates (aru). And in the same
way that a Japanese child would switch from  aru to  iru when learning that
corals are not rocks and sea anemones are not plants, a learner of L1 would
switch from  exist to  axist when learning that  ab is  a  composite.  However,
although this third option is possible, it is irrelevant here, because effectively
this splits up the domain of “existence” in ordinary English into two separate
domains  in  L1:  one  for  exist and  one  for  axist,  and  both  of  these  would,
therefore, be restricted existential quantifiers.
Regardless of which of the three options specifies the details of the case, the
difference between languages L1 to L3 is a difference of (default) domains of
the  existential  quantifier(s).  This  example,  therefore,  does  not  illustrate  or
reveal any  other kind of difference between existential quantifiers (which is
what Hirsch suggested, and what we are looking for).  There is,  however,  a




The first of these sentences, (s2), is identical to its translation into ordinary
English, “a exists”, but the second is translated something like “ab does not
exist, but a and b exist”.8 In other words, if applied to simples, “exists” means
the same in L4 as in ordinary English, but in case of composites it does not.
This is  somewhat similar to  Kripke’s (1982) “quus” and Goodman’s (1983)
“grue”, which are parallel with “plus” and “green”, respectively, up to a point
after  which they diverge.  That  is,  they are explicitly defined as “plus” and
“green”,  except in  some specific  circumstances.  Similarly here,  “exist”L4 is
defined as “exist”English except in some specific circumstances,  namely when
applied  to  composites.  It  should  be  noted  that  contrary  to  the  previous
8 Or  perhaps  “the  simples  a and  b composing  ab exist,  but  ab itself  is  just  a  convenient
shorthand for those simples and does not really exist itself.”
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example, attribution of “existence” is  not restricted in L4. Both simples and
composites  can  be  said  to  exist,  but  ‘existential  statements’  in  L4  are
differently translated into ordinary English if  they refer  to composites  than
when they refer to English. It may be argued, however, that “existence” in L4
is an implausibly, impossibly, or unnaturally gerrymandered concept, and I will
address that charge below.
If it is attempted to translate the ordinary English sentence
(s4) “ab exists.”
into L4, then there are again three options.
[1] Translation is impossible because there is no way to express existence of
composites in L4. This is improbable, if not impossible, for natural languages
for reasons mentioned under option [1] for the previous example. Anything
that  can  be  said  in  one  natural  language  can  be  said  in  another  natural
language, but what is easy to say in one language may be very difficult and
lengthy to say in another. Translation may be impossible in case of artificial or
semi-formal languages, but those are created with a purpose, and it is difficult
to imagine any other purpose for a language that cannot in any way express the
existence of composites than to confuse philosophers.
[2] Translation  is  possible  but  complex,  but  does  not  require  additional
predicates. An analogy in English could be the following:
(s5) “The cow is grazing.”
(s6) “The herd is grazing.”
Strictly speaking (s6) does not mean that the herd itself is grazing, but that the
cows in that herd are grazing. Similarly, it may be possible in L4 to translate
(s4) something like “ab itself, rather than a and b, exists.” However, if that is
the case, then – as in case of option [2] for the previous example – the apparent
difference  between  L4  and  ordinary  English  is  one  of  different  default
interpretations  (i.e. default  domains)  of  ambiguous  sentences  (about
composites), and can be easily avoided by more precise use of language.
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[3] Translation is possible, but requires additional predicates. If it cannot be
said in L4 that composites “exist”, but they can be said to “axist”, which is
correctly translated into ordinary English as “exist”, then the L4 translation of
(s4) would be “ab axists.” In this case, “axistence” would be restricted, as it
can only be attributed to composites, but “existence” would not. It seems that
the  aforementioned  charge  of  gerrymandering  is  the  only objection  to  this
option, which raises a number of questions: To what extent is “exist” in L4 a
gerrymandered  concept?  Are  there  reasons  to  assume  that  this  option  is
impossible? And, does a difference of this kind matter?
The  apparently  similarly  gerrymandered  notions  “quus”  and  “grue”  (see
above) were rejected by David Lewis  (1986) with an appeal to ‘naturalness’,
and this idea was borrowed by Sider  (2003; 2007) to block gerrymandering
notions  of  existence.  The  charge  of  gerrymandering  and  the  notion  of
naturalness, however, depend on a privileging of (ordinary) English, arousing
suspicions of  cultural  blinders.  What  if  ordinary English “existence”  is  the
gerrymandered concept, and the L4 concept is the ‘natural’ one? The easiest
way to test this is to assess whether ordinary English is gerrymandering from
the perspective of L4 by means of a comparison of a few ordinary English
sentences and their L4 translations:
ordinary English L4
(s7) “a exists.” “a exists.”
(s4) “ab exists.” “ab axists.”
(s8) “ab does not exist.” “ab does not axist.”
(s9) “ab does not exist, but a and b 
exist.”
“ab does not axist, and a and b exist.”
≡ “ab exists.”
The  last  of  these  sentences,  (s9),  was  suggested  above  as  the  English
translation  of  the  L4  sentence  (s3)  “ab exists.”  In  L4,  “ab exists”  is
synonymous to “ab does not axist, and a and b exist”, and consequently, either
sentence  would  be  an  accurate  translation  of  ordinary  English  (s9).  The
problem, of course, is in this sentence: English “not exist” is translated with L4
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“exist” or vice versa. English may seem a bit simpler than L4, having only one
concept  of  “existence”  rather  than two (“axistence”  being the  second),  but
considering the aforementioned case of the iru/aru distinction in Japanese, that
is  hardly  an  argument  for  the  unnaturalness  of  L4.  And  aside  from  this
difference,  the  two  directions  of  translation  seem  very  similar:  if  L4  is
gerrymandered from the perspective of ordinary English, than so is ordinary
English from the perspective of L4. That in turn means, that there is no ground
to privilege English, which undermines both the charge of gerrymandering and
the appeal to naturalness, or so it seems.
The pictures changes, however, if translation into a formal language is taken
into  account.  If  “existence”  in  ordinary  English  is  unrestricted  existential
quantification,  then  in  its  formal  counterpart   ℒE,  the  four  sentences  (s7),
(s4),  (s8),  and  (s9)  would  be   ∃x[a=x],   ∃x[ab=x],  ¬  ∃x[ab=x],  and
¬  ∃x[ab=x]  ∧∃y,z[(a=y) (∧ b=z)], respectively (or something very similar).  It  is
less obvious what formalizations of the L4 sentences in   4 would look like,ℒ
however. If speakers of L4 are aware that the distinction between “exist” and
“axist”  is  a  mere  grammatical  difference,  in  the  same  way  that  Japanese
speakers are aware of the similar distinction between “iru” and “aru”, then
formalizations in  4 of the first three sentences would be identical to those inℒ
 ℒE. For the two L4 translations of (s9) there would seem to be two competing
 4  formalizations:  ¬  ℒ ∃x[ab=x]  ∧∃y,z[(a=y) (∧ b=z)]  and   ∃x[ab=x],  but  L4
speakers  would immediately realize the  contradiction between the  two and
solve that by rejecting the latter formalization (because rejecting the former
would imply that (s4) and (s9) are synonymous in L4, which is not the case),
thus revealing the gerrymandering nature of their own language.
It is implausible that the speakers of L4 would not be aware that the distinction
between “exist” and “axist” is a mere grammatical difference, and even if that
would  be  the  case,  an  attempt  at  formalization  would  reveal  the  problem.
Formalization  of  existence  as  unrestricted  existential  quantification  and
axistence as a one-place predicate (which may be shorthand for a restricted
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existential  quantifier)  results  in  contradiction.9 Axistence would  then  imply
existence  because  the  formalization  of  the  translation  of  (s4)
 ∃x[axist(ab) (∧ ab=x)]  implies  the  formalization of  the  shorter translation of
(s9)   ∃x[ab=x]);  but  because  of  the  synonymy  of  the  shorter  and  longer
translations of (s9),  ∃x[ab=x] is equivalent to the formalization of the  longer
translation  ∃x,y,z[¬axist(ab) (∧ ab=x) (∧ a=y) (∧ b=z)], which in turn implies the
formalization  of  the  translation  of  (s8)   ∃x[¬axist(ab) (∧ ab=x)],  and  thus
existence implies non-axistence. In short:  axist(x)→exist(x)→¬axist(x), which
is an obvious contradiction.  And stumbling upon this  contradiction,  the L4
speaker would quickly find the source of the problem.
These  formalizations demonstrate  that  the  charge  of  gerrymandering is  not
necessarily based on a privileging of the English language, but could even be
made by a reflective L4 speaker herself (and thus no appeal to ‘naturalness’ is
needed). If this reflective L4 speaker would occupy herself with ontology, she
would quickly realize that her language is a possible source of obscurity and
confusion,  as  English  may  be  in  other  areas  of  inquiry  (and  perhaps  in
metaphysics  as  well),  and  introduce  a  technical  term  like  “æxistence”,
explicitly defined (in L4) as “axistence” when attributed to composites and as
“existence” when attributed to simples. (Conveniently, “æxistence” would be
identical to English “existence”.) However, even without such a terminological
innovation,  the  difference  between  L4  and  ordinary  English  would  not  be
problematic:  indeed, “existence” is a different concept in the two languages,
and the difference is not one of differing domains, but upon closer reflection it
would be clear – even to a speaker of L4 – that one of the two notions (namely
the ordinary English one) is superior and could (and most likely would) be
used  as  a  basis  for  translating,  interpreting,  and  formalizing  existential
statements.
9 Note that existence must be formalized as unrestricted existential quantification as that is one
of the premisses of the current search for difference other than differing domains.
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The examples discussed in the preceding pages show that although it seems to
be possible that natural (rather than formal or otherwise artificial) languages
have different unrestricted existential quantifiers in their lexicon, this would
require a notion of existence that is gerrymandered to such a degree that this
would  even  be  noticeable  to  a  (reflective)  speaker  of  that  language;
gerrymandered to such a degree, in fact, that – in some circumstances – that
speaker would need to introduce or borrow an un-gerrymandered notion of
existence  to  avoid  contradiction.  Although  this  may  be  a  hypothetical
possibility,  it is doubtful that such a natural language could even come into
existence, and if it did that it would be stable, and not immediately evolve into
an non-gerrymandered version. There is, therefore, very little reason to believe
that  there really can be any other  difference between existential  quantifiers
than  differing domains.  In  formal  languages,  that  is  –  by definition of  the
existential quantifier – the only possibility; and in natural languages exception
would require Kripkensteinian gerrymandering to  an  implausible  – perhaps
even impossible – degree.
There is then, only one kind of difference between notions of existence, and
that is a difference of domains, and any such  difference can be reduced to a
difference of properties in the expanded universe MU. By implication, there is
no fundamental difference between existence-like OCCs (i.e. quantifiers) and
OCCs  that  take  the  form  of  properties  such  as  ‘being  real’ or  ‘being  a
fundamental constituent of reality’. This, however, does not imply that there
are  infinitely many notions  of  existence  (or  OCCs  in  general)  that  are  all
equally good as ontological deflationists would claim.10 Not every property or
existence-like notion is equally appropriate for ontology. The final paragraphs
of this paper briefly present some of the main answers to the question what it
means for something to exist. Although none of these answers – that is, none
10 If  the  argument  in  this  paper  is  deflationist,  it  is  meta-ontologically  deflationist;  not
ontologically deflationist.
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of these OCCs – may be the single right answer or the single right OCC, all of
them have their merits, and any answer to the question that is the title of this
paper that deviates much from these is unlikely to be ontologically relevant.
Already mentioned a few times are the (neo-)Aristotelian property of ‘being a
fundamental  constituent  of  reality’ and similar  notions such  as  ‘being real’
(whatever  that  may  mean  exactly)  or  ‘being  fundamental’.  In  Buddhist
philosophy,  a  common  criterion  for  being  real  or  fundamental  (or  for
independent  existence)  is  being  causally  efficient.  Another,  more  formal
interpretation of being fundamental is defended by Peter van Inwagen in his
influential paper “Meta-ontology” (1998) and/or its most recent update (2009).
Van Inwagen presents five theses based on the work of Quine. The first four
theses can together be summarized as: “being” = “existence” = unrestricted
existential quantification  . The fifth thesis is of a very different nature: rather∃
than  defining  “existence”,  it  proposes  a  methodology  for  resolving
metaphysical debates (i.e. for deciding what exists) based on Quine’s notion of
‘ontological commitment’.  According to van Inwagen, metaphysical debates
are  to  be  resolved  by  specifying  the  (minimal)  ontological  commitments
implied in everything the debaters want to affirm. This is done by means of
formalization  in  FOL  and  discarding  the  alternative  formalizations  that
existentially  quantify  over  more  ‘things’ than  necessary.  Only  if  it  cannot
reasonably  be  avoided  to  existentially  quantify  over  x (by  reduction  to
something more primitive that is  accepted as existing, for example),  then  x
exists. In other words, existence is quantificational unavoidability. (This is not
a term van Inwagen uses, but is my attempt to capture the essence of his fifth
thesis as clearly and briefly as possible.) By implication, if the first four theses
are assumed to be consistent with the fifth, then the domain of van Inwagen’s
preferred  notion  of  existence  is  restricted  in  MU by the  property of  being
quantificationally  unavoidable.  This  criterion  leads  him  to  suggest  that
fictional  objects  exist  (1977)  and  that  wholes  and  composites  do not  exist
unless they constitute a life (1990).
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In addition to these (neo-)Aristotelian and related OCCs a different kind of
OCCs  can  be  derived  from  the  Kantian  distinction  between  things-in-
themselves and phenomenal appearances, or the Buddhist distinction between
ultimate and conventional reality (Brons 2013). Avoiding potentially confusing
terms (such as “noumenal”, which is interpreted rather differently by different
philosophers) and terms that are too closely associated with particular schools
of  thought,  we could distinguish the existence-like notions of  ‘independent
existence’ and ‘phenomenal existence’, or the associated properties of ‘being
independently real’ and ‘being phenomenal appearance’.11 A valid objection to
these labels may be that it suggests that the phenomenal is somehow less real,
which  is  disputable.  Historically,  in  this  kind  of  approach,  ‘being
independently real’ (being  thing-in-itself,  being  ultimately real,  etc.)  is  the
preferred OCC, and although this overlaps with the (neo-)Aristotelian ‘being
fundamental’ (etc.) it does not (necessarily) coincide.
Which of these OCCs is (or should be) preferred by ontologists depends on
focus, and on the questions that are intended to be answered (or even on how
exactly those are phrased). Perhaps there is a single best notion among those
mentioned here, or among variants left unmentioned, but it seems more likely
that OCCs are  essentially contested concepts (Gallie 1956), implying that no
impartial (and non-theory-laden) choice between the alternatives is possible.
There  is,  in  addition  to  these  OCCs  one  more  key  notion  of  existence:
unrestricted existential quantification in MU, i.e.   in the universe that includes∃
everything in all other universes. In ordinary English, this can be described
best as ‘existence in some sense’. Fictional objects exist in some sense; wholes
and compositions exist in some sense (and so do simples); apceans and incars
11 Applying this same terminology, the general terms for Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’ (and possibly
‘noumenal reality’) or Buddhist ‘ultimate reality’ (paramārthasat) on the one hand and Kant’s
(world of) ‘phenomenal appearances’ or Buddhist ‘conventional reality’ (saṃvṛtisat) on the
other,  would  be  independent  reality and  phenomenal  reality.  On  this  distinction,  and  the
(necessary)  connections  between these  two ‘levels’ (or  aspects,  etc.)  of  reality,  see  Brons
(2012; 2013).
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exist  in some sense;  everything exists in some sense (this follows from the
definition of MU). In ordinary English, “existence” often means such ‘existence
in some sense’ (albeit with a temporal restriction), but more often – especially
in negations – it means something like ‘being real’. Existence in some sense is
a maximally permissive notion (see also Eklund 2009). It is, however,  not an
ontological core concept (OCC). Because it is maximally permissive, because
everything exists in some sense, the notion is nearly useless in ontology: what
applies to everything distinguishes nothing.12
references
Brons,  L.L.  (2011),  “Applied  relativism  and  Davidson’s  arguments  against  conceptual
schemes”, The Science of Mind 49, pp. 221-240.
Brons,  L.L.  (2012),  “Dharmakīrti,  Davidson,  and  Knowing  Reality”,  Comparative
Philosophy 3.1, pp. 30-57.
Brons, L.L. (2013), “Meaning and reality: a cross-traditional encounter”, in: B. Mou & R.
Tieszen, constructive engagement of analytic and Continental approaches in philosophy,
Leiden: Brill, pp. 199-220.
Carnap,  R.  (1950),  “Empiricism,  semantics,  and  ontology”,  in:  (1956),  Meaning  and
Necessity, second edition, Chicago: Unviersity of Chicago Press, pp. 205-21.
Chalmers, D., Manley, D. & Wasserman, R. (eds.) (2009), Metametaphysics: new essays on
the foundations of ontology, Oxford: Clarendon.
Davidson, D. (1974), ‘On the very idea of a conceptual scheme’, in: (1984), pp. 183-198.
Davidson, D. (1977), “Reality without reference”, in: (1984), pp. 215-225.
Davidson, D. (1984), Inquiries into truth and interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon.
Davidson, D. (1988), ‘The myth of the subjective’, in: (2001), pp. 39-52.
Davidson, D. (1989), “What is present to the mind”, in: (2001), pp. 53-67.
Davidson, D. (2001), Subjective, intersubjective, objective, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12 This maximally permissive notion of existence has its use, of course, as a technical notion in
formalizations in a language with MU as its universe. Aside from that, it also seems to be the
default if no domain is specified (either explicitly or contextually). Unqualified “existence”,
unless there is a reason to assume otherwise, is this maximally permissive “existence”, and is,
therefore, ontologically ‘meaningless’.
73
Eklund, M. (2009), “Carnap and ontological pluralism”, in: Chalmers et al. (2009), pp. 130-
156.
Fine, K. (2006), “Relatively unrestricted quantification”, in: Rayo & Uzquiano (2006), pp.
20-44.
Fine, K. (2009), “The question of ontology”, in: Chalmers et al. (2009), pp. 157-177.
Frege, G. (1893), Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Volume I, Jena: Pohle.
Gallie,  W.B.  (1956),  “Essentially  contested  concepts”,  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian
Society 56, pp. 167-198
Goodman, N. (1983), Fact, fiction, and forecast, Harvard University Press.
Hirsch, E. (2002), “Quantifier variance and realism”, Philosophical Issues 12, pp. 51-72.
Kripke, S.A. (1982),  Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press.
Lewis, D. (1986), On the plurality of worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.
Peters,  S.  & D.  Westerståhl  (2006),  Quantifiers  in  language  and  logic,  Oxford:  Oxford
University Press.
Quine, W.V.O. (1968), ‘Ontological relativity’, The Journal of Philosophy 65.7, 185-212.
Rayo,  A.  & G.  Uzquiano  (eds.)  (2006),  Absolute  generality,  Oxford:  Oxford  University
Press.
Ryle, G. (1949), The concept of mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schaffer, J. (2009), “On what grounds what?”, in: Chalmers et al. (2009), pp. 347-383.
Sider, T. (2003), Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Sider, T. (2007), “Against vague and unnatural existence: reply to Liebesman and Eklund”,
Noûs 43.3, pp. 557-567.
Sider, T. (2009), “Ontological realism”, in: Chalmers et al. (2009), pp. 384-423.
van Inwagen, P. (1977), “Creatures of fiction”, in: (2001), pp. 37-56.
van Inwagen, P. (1990), Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
van Inwagen, P. (1998), “Meta-ontology”, in: (2001), pp. 13-31.
van Inwagen, P. (2001), Ontology, identity, and modality: essays in metaphysics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
van Inwagen, P. (2009), “Being, existence, and ontological commitment”, in: Chalmers et al.
(2009), pp. 472-506.
74
